Recommendation systems often face exploration-exploitation tradeoffs: the system can only learn about the desirability of new options by recommending them to some user. Such systems can thus be modeled as multi-armed bandit settings; however, users are self-interested and cannot be made to follow recommendations. We ask whether exploration can nevertheless be performed in a way that scrupulously respects agents' interests-i.e., by a system that acts as a fiduciary. More formally, we introduce a model in which a recommendation system faces an exploration-exploitation tradeoff under the constraint that it can never recommend any action that it knows yields lower reward in expectation than an agent would achieve if it acted alone. Our main contribution is a positive result: an asymptotically optimal, incentive compatible, and ex-ante individually rational recommendation algorithm.
Introduction
Multi-armed bandits (henceforth MABs) [9, 11] is a well-studied problem domain in online learning. In that setting, several arms (i.e., actions) are available to a planner; each arm is associated with an unknown reward distribution, from which rewards are sampled independently each time the arm is pulled. The planner selects arms sequentially, aiming to maximize her sum of rewards. This often involves a tradeoff between exploiting arms that have been observed to yield good rewards and exploring arms that could yield even higher rewards. Many variations of this model exist, including stochastic [1, 21] , Bayesian [2] , contextual [13, 29] , adversarial [3] and non-stationary [8, 23] bandits. This paper considers a setting motivated by recommender systems. Such systems suggest actions to agents based on a set of current beliefs and assess agents' experiences to update these beliefs. For instance, in navigation applications (e.g., Waze; Google maps) the system recommends routes to drivers based on beliefs about current traffic congestion. The planner's objective is to minimize users' average travel time. The system cannot be sure of the congestion on a road segment that no agents have recently traversed; thus, navigation systems offer the best known route most of the time and explore occasionally. Of course, users are not eager to perform such exploration; they are self-interested in the sense that they care more about minimizing their own travel times than they do about conducting surveillance about traffic conditions for the system.
A recent line of work [22, 26] , inspired by the viewpoint of algorithmic mechanism design [27, 28] , deals with that challenge by incentivizing exploration-that is, setting up the system in such a way that no user would ever rationally choose to decline an action that was recommended to him. The key reason that it is possible to achieve this property while still performing a sufficient amount of exploration is that the planner has more information than the agents. At each point in time, each agent holds beliefs about the arms' reward distributions; the planner has the same information, but also knows about all of the arms previously pulled and the rewards obtained in each case. More specifically, Kremer et al. [22] consider a restricted setting and devise an MAB algorithm that is incentive compatible (IC), meaning that whenever the algorithm recommends arm i to an agent, the best response of the agent is to select arm i.
Although this approach explicitly reasons about agents' incentives, it does not treat agents fairly: agents who are asked to explore receive lower expected rewards. More precisely, these IC MAB algorithms reach optimality (in the static setting) or minimize regret (in the online setting) by intentionally providing (a priori ) sub-optimal recommendations to some of the agents. In particular, such IC MAB algorithms lead agents astray from the default arm-the a priori superior arm, which would be every agent's rational choice in the absence both of knowledge of other agents' experiences and of a trusted recommendation. Thus, it would be natural for agents to see the recommendations of such IC MAB algorithms as a betrayal of trust; they might ask "if you believed that what you recommended to me was worse than what I would have picked without your help, why did you recommend it?" Of course, the scale of this problem gets worse as the importance of the recommendation to the agent increases. At the extreme end of the spectrum, it would clearly be unethical for a doctor to recommend a treatment to a patient that she considers sub-optimal, even if doing so would lead to better medical outcomes for society as a whole. Similarly, nobody wants a financial advisor who occasionally recommends stocks about which she has low confidence in order to improve her predictive model. Indeed, in many domains such behavior is illegal: e.g., in jurisdictions where a financial advisor has a fiduciary duty to her clients, she is legally required to act at all times for the sole benefit of her clients.
Our contribution In this paper we introduce the idea of fiduciary bandits. We explore a definition of a recommender's fiduciary duty that we call ex-ante individual rationality (EAIR). A mechanism is EAIR if any probability distribution over arms that it selects has expected reward that is always at least as great as the reward of the default arm, both calculated based on the recommender's knowledge (which may be more extensive than that of agents). This means that, while it is possible for the mechanism to sample a recommendation from the distribution that is a priori inferior to the default arm, the agent receiving the recommendation is nevertheless guaranteed to realize expected reward weakly greater than that offered by the default arm-independently from the other agents and their recommendations. Satisfying this requirement makes a MAB algorithm more appealing to agents; we foresee that in some domains, such a requirement might be imposed as fairness constraints by authorities.
Algorithmically, we focus on constructing an optimal EAIR mechanism that also satisfies the IC requirement. Our model is similar to that of Kremer et al. [22] , but with K ≥ 2 arms and uniform agent arrival. 1 In particular, the planner and the agents have (the same) Bayesian prior over the rewards of the arms, which are fixed but initially unknown. The main technical contribution of this paper is an IC and EAIR mechanism, which obtains the highest possible social welfare by an ex-ante IR mechanism up to a factor of o( 1 n ), where n is the number of agents. The optimality of our mechanism, which we term Fiduciary Explore & Exploit (FEE) and outline as Algorithm 1, follows from a careful construction of the exploration phase. Our analysis uses an intrinsic property of the setting, which is further elaborated in Theorem 1.
To complement this analysis, we also investigate the more demanding concept of ex-post individual rationality (EPIR). The EPIR condition requires that a recommended arm must never be a priori inferior to the default arm given the planner's knowledge. The two requirements differ in the guarantees that they provide to agents and correspondingly allow the system different degrees of freedom in performing exploration. We design an asymptotically optimal IC and EPIR mechanism and analyze the social welfare cost of adopting both EAIR and EPIR mechanisms.
Related work Background on MABs can be found in Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [11] and a recent survey [9] . Kremer et al. [22] is the first work of which we are aware that investigated the problem of incentivizing exploration. The authors considered two deterministic arms, a prior known both to the agents and the planner, and an arrival order that is common knowledge among all agents, and presented an optimal IC mechanism. Cohen and Mansour [14] extended this optimality result to several arms under further assumptions. This setting has also been extended to regret minimization [26] , social networks [4, 5] , and heterogeneous agents [12, 19] . All of this literature disallows paying agents; monetary incentives for exploration are discussed in e.g., [12, 16] . None of this work considers an individual rationality constraint as we do here.
Our work also contributes to the growing body of work on fairness in Machine Learning [7, 15, 18, 24] . In the context of MABs, some recent work focuses on fairness in the sense of treating arms fairly. In particular, Liu et al. [25] aim at treating similar arms similarly and Joseph et al. [20] demand that a worse arm is never favored over a better one despite a learning algorithm's uncertainty over the true payoffs. Finally, we note that the EAIR requirement we impose-that agents be guaranteed an expected reward at least as high as that offered by a default arm-is also related to the burgeoning field of safe reinforcement learning [17] .
Model
Let A = {a 1 , . . . a K } be a set of K arms (actions). The rewards are deterministic but initially unknown: the reward of arm a i is a random variable X i , and (X i ) K i=1 are mutually independent. We denote by R i the observed value of X i . Further, we denote by µ i the expected value of X i , and assume for notational convenience that µ 1 ≥ · · · ≥ µ K . We also make the simplifying assumption that the rewards (X i ) K i=1 are fully supported on the set [H] = {1, . . . , H}, and refer to the continuous case in Section 5.
The n agents arrive in a random order, σ : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n}, where σ is selected uniformly at random from the set of all permutations. Let j denote an agent and l denote a stage (i.e., a position in the ordering). The proposition l = σ(j) asserts that agent j arrived at stage l. In what follows, we refer to agents according to the (random) stage at which they arrive, and not according to their names. 2 We denote by a l the action of the agent arriving at stage l (not the action of agent l). The reward of the agent arriving at stage l is denoted by R l , and is a function of the arm she chooses. For instance, by selecting arm a r the agent obtains R l (a r ) = X r . Each agent aims at maximizing her payoff. Agents are fully aware of the distribution of (X i ) K i=1 . A mechanism is a recommendation engine that interacts with agents. The input for the mechanism at stage l is the sequence of arms pulled and rewards received by the previous l − 1 agents. The output of the mechanism is a recommended arm for agent l. Formally, a mechanism is a function M :
; of course, we can also define a deterministic notion that maps simply to A. The mechanism makes action recommendations, but cannot compel agents to follow these recommendations. We say that a mechanism is incentive compatible (IC) when following its recommendations constitutes an equilibrium 3 : that is, when given a recommendation and given that others follow their own recommendations, an agent's best response is to follow her own recommendation.
Definition 1 (Incentive Compatibility).
A mechanism M is incentive compatible (IC) if ∀l ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for every history h = (h 1 , . . . , h l−1 ) ∈ (A × R + ) l−1 and for all actions a r , a i ∈ A,
The mechanism has a global objective, which is to maximize agents' social welfare n l=1 R l (a l ). When a mechanism M is IC, we can also talk about the mechanism's (expected) social welfare under the assumption that the agents follow its recommendations, :
A mechanism M * is said to be optimal w.r.t. the problem parameters if for every other mechanism M ′ it holds that SW (M * ) ≥ SW (M ′ ). A mechanism M * is asymptotically optimal if, for every "large enough" number of agents n greater than some number n ′ , the social welfare of the agents under M * is at most o( 1 n ) away from the social welfare attained by the best possible mechanism for n agents (that is, if for every other mechanism M ′ it holds that
As elaborated above, in this paper we focus on mechanisms that are individually rational. Since agents are aware of the distributions (X i ) K i=1 , they also know that µ 1 = max i µ i ; hence, we shall assume that every agent's default action is a 1 . As a result, a fiduciary mechanism should guarantee each agent at least the reward provided by action a 1 . We now formally define this notion, using the property of ex-ante individual rationality (EAIR).
Definition 2 (Ex-Ante Individual Rationality). A mechanism M is ex-ante individually rational (EAIR) if for every agent l ∈ {1, . . . , n}, every value R 1 in the support of X 1 , and every history
Due to the mutual independence assumption, we must have E(X r | h) = R r if arm a r was observed under the history h and E(X r | h) = µ r otherwise. An EAIR mechanism must select a portfolio of arms with expected reward never inferior to the reward obtained for a 1 . We also discuss a more strict form of rationality, namely ex-post individual rationality (EPIR) in Section 4.
Example
We now give an example to illustrate our setting and to familiarize the reader with our notation. Consider K = 3 arms, H = 50 and X i ∼ U ni{1, . . . , 10(K − i + 1)} for i ∈ {1, . . . , K}; thus µ 1 = 15, µ 2 = 10, and µ 3 = 5. As always, a 1 is the default arm. To satisfy EAIR, a mechanism should recommend a 1 to the first agent, since EAIR requires that the expected value of any recommendation should weakly exceed R 1 . Let h 1 = (a 1 , R 1 ) be the history after the first agent. Now, we have three different cases. First, if R 1 > µ 2 = 10, we know that E(X 2 | h 1 ) < R 1 and E(X 3 | h 1 ) < R 1 ; therefore, an EAIR mechanism can never explore any other arm, since any distribution over {a 2 , a 3 } would violate Inequality (2) . Second, if R 1 ≤ µ 3 = 5, then E(X 2 | h 1 ) ≥ R 1 and E(X 3 | h 1 ) ≥ R 1 , and hence an EAIR mechanism can explore both a 2 and a 3 .
The third and most interesting case is where µ 3 < R 1 ≤ µ 2 , as when R 1 = 8. In this case, arm a 3 could only be recommended through a portfolio. An EAIR mechanism could select any distribution over {a 2 , a 3 } that satisfies Inequality (2): any
This means that an EAIR mechanism can potentially explore arm a 3 , yielding higher expected social welfare overall than simply recommending a non-inferior arm deterministically.
Asymptotically Optimal IC-EAIR Mechanism
In this section we present the main technical contribution of this paper: a mechanism that asymptotically optimally balances the explore-exploit tradeoff while satisfying both EAIR and incentive compatibility. The mechanism, which we term Fiduciary Explore & Exploit (FEE), is described as Algorithm 1. FEE is an event-based protocol that triggers every time an agent arrives. We now give an overview of FEE, focusing on the case where all agents adopt the recommendation of the mediator; this is reasonable because we will go on to show that FEE is IC. 4 We explain the algorithm's exploration phase in Subsection 3.1, describe the overall algorithm in Subsection 3.2, and prove the algorithm's formal guarantees in Subsection 3.3.
FEE is composed of three phases: primary exploration (Lines 1-6), secondary exploration (Lines 7-19), and exploitation (Lines 20). During the primary exploration phase, the mechanism compares the default arm a 1 to whichever other arms are permitted by the individual rationality constraint. This turns out to be challenging for two reasons. First, the order in which arms are explored matters; tackling them in the wrong order can reduce the set of arms that can be considered overall. Second, it is nontrivial to search in the continuous space of probability distributions over arms. To address this latter issue, we present a key lemma that allows us to use dynamic programming and find the optimal exploration policy in time O(K 2 H 3 2 K ). Because we expect K either to be fixed or to be significantly smaller than n, H, this policy is computationally efficient. Moreover, we note that the optimal exploration policy can be computed offline prior to the agents' arrival.
The primary exploration phase terminates in one of two scenarios: either the reward R 1 of arm a 1 is the best that was observed and thus no other arm could be explored (as in our example when R 1 > 10, or when R 1 = 8 and exploring a 2 yielded R 2 ≤ R 1 and thus a 3 could not be explored), or another arm a i was found to be superior to a 1 : i.e., an arm a i was observed for which R i > R 1 . In the latter case, the mechanism gains the option of conducting a secondary exploration, using arm a i to investigate all the arms that were not explored in the primary exploration phase. The third and final phase-to which we must proceed directly after the primary exploration phase if that phase does not identify an arm superior to the default arm-is to exploit the most rewarding arm observed.
Primary Exploration Phase
Performing primary exploration optimally requires solving a planning problem; it is a challenging one, because it involves a continuous action space and a number of states exponential in K and H. We approach this task as a Goal Markov Decision Process (GMDP) (see, e.g., [6] ) that abstracts everything but pure exploration. In our GMDP encoding, all terminal states fall into one of two categories. The first category is histories that lead to pure exploitation of a 1 , which can arise either because EAIR permits no arm to be explored or because all explored arms yield rewards inferior to the observed R 1 ; the second is histories in which an arm superior to a 1 was found. Non-terminal states thus represent histories in which it is still permissible for some arms to be explored. The set of actions in each non-terminal state is the set of distributions over the non-observed arms (i.e., portfolios) corresponding to the history represented in that state, which satisfy the EAIR condition. The transition probabilities encode the probability of choosing each candidate arm from a portfolio; observe that the rewards of each arm are fixed, so this is not a source of additional randomness in our model. GMDP rewards are given in terminal nodes only: either the observed R 1 if no superior arm was found or the expected value of the maximum between the superior reward discovered and the maximal reward of all unobserved arms (since in this case, as we show later on, the mechanism is able to explore all arms w.h.p. during the secondary exploration phase).
Formally, the GMDP is a tuple S, A, P, R , where
is the set of arm-reward pairs that have been observed so far, with each a appearing at most once in O (since rewards from the arms are deterministic): for every (O, U ) and every a ∈ A, |{c | (a, c) ∈ O}| ≤ 1. U ⊆ A is the set of arms not yet explored. The initial state is thus s 0 = (∅, A). For every non-empty 5 set of pairs O we define α(O) to be the reward observed for arm a 1 , and β(O) = max c:∃a,(a,c)∈O c to be the maximal reward observed.
• A = s∈S A s is an infinite set of actions. For each s = (O, U ) ∈ S, A s is defined as follows:
This condition implies that we can move to secondary exploration.
3. Otherwise, A s is a subset of ∆(U ), such that p ∈ A s if and only if
Notice that this resembles the EAIR condition given in Inequality (2) . Moreover, the case where none of the remaining arms have strong enough priors to allow exploration falls here as a vacuous case of the above inequality.
We denote by S T the set of terminal states, namely S T = {s ∈ S | A s = ∅}.
5 Due to the construction, every non-empty O must contain (a1, c) for some c ∈ [H].
• P is the transition probability function. Let s = (O, U ) ∈ S, and let
. Then, the transition probability from s to s ′ given an action p is defined by P(s ′ |s, p) = p(a i ) Pr(X i = c). If s ′ is some other state that does not meet the conditions above, then let P(s ′ |s, p) = 0 for every p ∈ A s .
• R : S T → R is the reward function, defined on terminal states only. For each terminal state
That is, when a 1 was the highest-reward arm observed, the reward of a terminal state is α(O); otherwise, it is the expectation of the maximum between β(O) and the highest reward of all unobserved arms. The reward depends on unobserved arms since the secondary exploration phase allows us to explore all these arms; hence, their values are also taken into account.
A policy π : (S × A) * × S → A is a function from all GMDP histories (sequences of states and actions) and a current state to an action. A policy π is valid if for every history h and every non-terminal state s, π(h, s) ∈ A s . A policy π is stationary if for every two histories h, h ′ and a state s, π(h, s) = π(h ′ , s). When discussing a stationary policy, we thus neglect its dependency on h, writing π(s). Given a policy π and a state s, we denote by W (π, s) the expected reward of π when initialized from s, which is defined recursively from the terminal states:
We now turn to our technical results. The following lemma shows that we can safely focus on stationary policies that effectively operate on a significantly reduced state space. Lemma 1. For every policy π there exists a stationary policy π ′ such that (1) π ′ (s) = π ′ (s ′ ) for every pair of states s = (O, U ) and
Lemma 1 tells us that there exists an optimal, stationary policy that selects the same action in every pair of states that share the same unobserved set U and values α(O) and β(O), but are distinguished in the O component. Thus, we do not need a set of states whose size depends on the number of possible arm-reward observation histories: all we need to record is U , α(O) and β(O), reducing the number of states to O(2 K H 2 ).
We still have one more challenge to overcome: the set of actions available in each state is uncountable; hence, employing standard value iteration or policy iteration is infeasible. Instead, we prove that there exists an optimal "simple" policy, which we denote π * . Given two indices i, r ∈ {2, . . . , K}, we denote by p α ir (for i = r) and by p α ii (for i = r) the distributions over
is clear from context, we omit it from the superscript. We are now ready to describe the policy π * , which we later prove to be optimal. For the initial state
The optimality of π * follows from a property that is formally proven in Theorem 1: any policy π that satisfies the conditions of Lemma 1 can be presented as a mixture of policies that solely take actions of the form (p ir ) i,r . As a result, we can improve π by taking the best such policy from that mixture. We derive π * via dynamic programming, where the base cases are the set of terminal states. For any other state, π * (s) is the best action of the form p ir as defined above, considering all states that are reachable from s. While any policy π ′ can be encoded as a weighted sum over such "simple" policies, π * is the best one, and hence is optimal.
Theorem 1. For every valid policy π and every state s, it holds that W (π * , s) ≥ W (π, s).
Since our compressed state representation consists of O(2 K H 2 ) states, the computation of π * in each stage requires us to consider O(K 2 ) candidate actions, each of which involves summation of at most H + 1 summands; thus, π * can be computed in O(2 K K 2 H 3 ) time.
Intuitive Description of the Fiduciary Explore & Exploit Algorithm
We now present the FEE algorithm, stated formally as Algorithm 1. The primary exploration phase (Lines 1-6) is based on the GMDP from the previous subsection. It is composed of computing π * and then producing recommendations according to its actions, each of which defines a distribution over (at most) two actions. Let (U, O) denote the terminal state reached by π * (the primary exploration selects a fresh arm in each stage; hence such a state is reached after at most K agents).
We then enter the secondary exploration phase. If β(O) = R 1 then this phase is vacuous: no distribution over the unobserved arms can satisfy the EAIR condition and/or all the observed arms are inferior to arm a 1 . On the other hand, if β(O) > R 1 (Line 7), we found an arm ar with a reward superior to R 1 , and can use it to explore all the remaining arms. For every a i ∈ U , the mechanism operates as follows. If the probability of a i yielding a reward greater than ar is zero, we neglect it (Lines 11-13). Else, if µ i ≥ R 1 , we recommend a i . This is manifested in the second condition in Line 15. Otherwise, µ i < R 1 . In this case, we select a distribution over {ar, a i } that satisfies the EAIR condition and explore a i with the maximal possible probability, which is pr i (i). As we show formally in the proof of Lemma 2, the probability of exploring a i in this case is at least 1 H , implying that after H tries in expectation the algorithm would succeed to explore a i .
Ultimately (Line 20), FEE recommends the best observed arm to all the remaining agents.
Algorithmic Guarantees
We begin by arguing that FEE is indeed EAIR.
Proposition 1. FEE satisfies the EAIR condition.
One more property FEE exhibits is IC. The next theorem shows that when there are enough agents, the best action of each agent is to accept FEE's recommendation. To present it, we introduce Draw arm a i ∼ π * (s), recommend arm a i and observe R i .
5:
while U is not empty do
9:
Let ar s.t. ar ∈ arg max ar∈A\U R r .
10:
Select an arbitrary arm a i ∈ U .
11:
if Pr(X i > Rr) = 0 then
12:
U ← U \ {a i } .
13:
continue.
14:
Recommend a i and observe R i .
17:
18:
Recommend ar. 20: Recommend a i * ∈ arg max a i ∈A\U R i to all agents.
the following quantity δ.
In words, δ i is the probability that arm a i is superior to all other arms. Clearly, if δ i = 0 for some i, we can safely ignore that arm and never explore it; therefore, δ i > 0 for every arm a i . Finally, let δ = min i∈[K] δ i . Theorem 2 implies that if there are poly(H, K,
We now move on to consider the social welfare of FEE. First, we show that the expected value of π * at s 0 , denoted by W (π * , s 0 ), upper bounds the social welfare of any EAIR mechanism.
Theorem 3. For every mechanism M which is EAIR, SW (M ) ≤ W (π * , s 0 ).
The proof proceeds by contradiction: given an EAIR mechanism M , we construct a series of progressively-easier-to-analyze EAIR mechanisms with non-decreasing social welfare; we modify the final mechanism by granting it oracular capabilities, making it violate the EAIR property and yet preserving reducibility to a policy for the GMDP of Subsection 3.1. We then argue via the optimality of π * that the oracle mechanism cannot obtain a social welfare greater than W (π * , s 0 ). Next, we lower bound the social welfare of FEE by
The proof relies mainly on an argument that the primary and secondary explorations will not be too long on average: after (K + 1)H agents the mechanism is likely to begin exploiting. Noting that the lower bound of Lemma 2 asymptotically approaches the upper bound of Theorem 3, we conclude that FEE is asymptotically optimal.
Analysis
We now analyze the loss in social welfare imposed by the fiduciary constraint. Let OPT, OPT EAIR denote the best asymptotic social welfare (w.r.t. some instance K, A, (X i ) and infinitely many agents) achievable by an unconstrained mechanism and an EAIR mechanism, respectively. Proposition 2. For every K, H ∈ N such that K ≥ 2, there exists an instance K, A, (X i ) with
Proposition 2 shows that when K and H have the same magnitude, the ratio is on the order of H, meaning that EAIR mechanisms perform poorly when a large number of different reward values are possible. However, this result describes the worst case; it turns out that optimal EAIR mechanisms have constant ratio under some reward distributions. For example, as we show in the appendix, this ratio is at most 8 7 if X i ∼ U ni{1, . . . H} for every i ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
Ex-Post Individually Rational Mechanism
Notice that EAIR mechanisms guarantee each agent the value of the default arm, but only in expectation. In this subsection, we propose a more strict form of individual rationality, ex-post individual rationality (EPIR).
Definition 3 (Ex-Post Individual Rationality).
A mechanism M is ex-post individually rational (EPIR) if for every agent l ∈ {1, . . . , n}, every value R 1 in the support of X 1 , every history h = (h 1 , . . . , h l−1 ) ∈ (A × R + ) l−1 , and every arm a r such that Pr(M (h) = r) > 0, it holds that E(X r | h) ≥ R 1 .
Satisfying EPIR means that the mechanism never recommends an arm that is a priori inferior to arm a 1 . Noticeably, every EPIR mechanism is also EAIR, yet EPIR mechanisms are quite conservative, since they can only explore arms that yield expected rewards of at least the value R 1 obtained for a 1 . We now provide the intuitive IC and EPIR mechanism M EPIR , which is also asymptotically optimal. First, M EPIR explores a 1 , and observes R 1 . Then, it explores all arms a i such that µ i ≥ R 1 , one at each stage, in any arbitrary order. When no additional arm could be explored (due to the EPIR condition), it exploits the best arm observed.
Proposition 3. M EPIR is IC, EPIR and asymptotically optimal among all EPIR mechanisms.
Next, we consider the cost of adopting the stricter EPIR condition rather than EAIR. Let OPT EPIR be the best asymptotic social welfare achievable by an EPIR mechanism. As we show, by providing a more strict fiduciary guarantee, the social welfare may be harmed by a factor of H. 
Conclusions and Discussion
This paper introduces a model in which a recommender system must manage an explorationexploitation tradeoff under the constraint that it may never knowingly make a recommendation that will yield lower reward than any individual agent would achieve if he/she acted without relying on the system. We see considerable scope for follow-up work. First, from a technical point of view, our algorithmic results are limited to discrete reward distributions. One possible future direction would be to present an algorithm for the continuous case. More conceptually, we see natural extensions of EPIR and EAIR to stochastic settings [10] , either by assuming a prior and requiring the conditions w.r.t. the posterior distribution or by requiring the conditions to hold with high probability. Moreover, we are intrigued by non-stationary settings [8] -where e.g., rewards follow a Markov process-since the planner would be able to sample a priori inferior arms with high probability assuming the rewards change fast enough, thereby reducing regret.
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• Else, set π * (s) = p i * r * such that
6 Omitted Proofs from Section 3.1
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof follows from Propositions 5 and 6 below.
Proposition 5. For every non-stationary policy π, there exists a stationary policy π ′ such that for every state s ∈ S, W (π, s) ≤ W (π ′ , s).
Moreover, the following Proposition 6 implies that we can substantially reduce the state space by disregarding the observed part O and Proposition 6. For every stationary policy π there exists a stationary policy π ′ such that:
2. for every state s, W (π ′ , s) ≥ W (π, s).
Proof of Proposition 5. Fix an arbitrary non-stationary policy π. We prove the claim by iterating over all states in an increasing order of the number of elements in U . We use induction to show that the constructed π ′ indeed satisfies the assertion. For every s = (O, U ) ∈ S such that |U | = 1, i.e., U = {a}. If s is terminal, then A s = ∅ and W (π, s) = W (π ′ , s) = α(O). Otherwise, the unique element in A s is the action that assigns probability 1 to a, and by setting π ′ (s) = π(s) we get W (π ′ , s) = W (π, s).
Assume that the assertion holds for every |U | ≤ j; namely, that W (π ′ , s) ≥ W (π, s) for all s = (O, U ) ∈ S with |U | ≤ j. We now prove the assertion for s = (O, U ) ∈ S with |U | = j + 1. If s is a terminal state, then we are done. Else, since U and the support of each arm are finite, there exists a finite number of possible histories that lead from s 0 to s that we will mark as h 1 , . . . h w . For every possible history h ∈ {h 1 , . . . h w }, π assigns an action p h ∈ A s that (can) depend on the history h. Let
breaking ties arbitrarily. We set π ′ (s) = p * . Hence we get:
Pr(h) arg max
s). This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 5, and is given for completeness. Fix an arbitrary stationary policy π. We prove the claim by iterating over all states in an increasing order of the number of elements in U . We use induction to show that the constructed π ′ indeed satisfies the assertion. For every s = (O, U ) ∈ S such that |U | = 1, i.e., U = {a}, if s is terminal then W (π, s) = W (π ′ , s) = α(O). Otherwise, the unique element in A s is the action that assigns probability 1 to a; hence, by setting π ′ (s) = π(s) we get W (π ′ , s) = W (π, s).
Assume the assertion holds for every |U | ≤ j; namely, that W (π ′ , s) ≥ W (π, s) for all s = (O, U ) ∈ S with |U | ≤ j. Next, we prove the assertion for s = (O, U ) ∈ S with |U | = j + 1. If s is a terminal state, then we are done. Else, since the size of O and the support of each arm are finite, there exists only a finite number of states with the same U and α, which we mark as
breaking ties arbitrarily. Next, set π ′ (s) = p * . We have that
Proof of Theorem 1. Fix an arbitrary policy π. We prove the claim by iterating over all states in an increasing order of the number of elements of U . We use induction to show that the constructed π * indeed satisfies the assertion. For every s = (O, U ) ∈ S such that |U | = 1, the claim holds trivially. To see this, recall that if s is terminal, A s = ∅; otherwise, the unique element in A s is the action that assigns probability 1 to the sole element in U . Either way, W (π * , s) = W (π, s).
Assume the assertion holds for every |U | ≤ j; namely, that W (π * , s) ≥ W (π, s) for all s = (O, U ) ∈ S with |U | ≤ j. If s is a terminal state, then we are done. Else, we shall make use of the following claim, which shows that every action in A s can be viewed as a weighted sum over the elements of {p i,r ∈ A s }. Claim 1. For any s ∈ S and p ∈ A s , there exist coefficients (z i,r ) (a i ,ar)∈U ×U such that
• (a i ,ar)∈U ×U z i,r = 1, and
The proof of the claim appears below this proof. In particular, Claim 1 suggests that π(s), which is valid and thus π(s) ∈ A s w.p. 1, can be presented as a weighted sum over all pairs
where the last equality follows since π * (s) = p i * ,r * and by the definition of (i * , r * ) given in Equation (5). To sum, the constructed π * satisfies W (π, s) ≤ W (π * , s) for every state s.
Proof of Claim 1. To ease readability, we shall use the notation α = α(O) and d i = |α − µ i | in this proof. Let s be an arbitrary state and p ∈ A s be an arbitrary action. Notice that p could be described as
where v i = p(i) and z i,r = 0 for every a i , a r ∈ U such that p ir ∈ A s . We now describe a procedure that shifts mass from the set (v i ) i to (z i,r ) i,r , while still satisfying the equality in Equation (8) . Each time we apply this procedure we decrease the value of one or more elements from (v i ) i and increase one or more elements from (z i,r ) i,r by the same quantity. As a result, when it converges (assuming that it does), namely when i v i = 0, we are guaranteed that all the conditions of the claim hold. Importantly, throughout the course of this procedure, the following inequalities hold
For the initial set of (v i ) i Equations (9)- (10) trivially hold due to the way we initialize (v i ) i and since p ∈ A s implies that
In each step of the procedure, we use the prime notation to denote the coefficients in the end of that step. The procedure operates as follows:
• If v i = 0 for every a i ∈ U , the claim holds.
• Else, if for every i such that v i > 0, µ i ≥ α, then for every i with v i > 0 set z ′ i,i = z i,i + v i and set v ′ i = 0. Notice that after this change Equations (8)- (10) still hold.
• There exists i with µ i < α and v i > 0. Consequently, since Equation (9) holds, there must exist r such that µ r > α and v r > 0. We divide the analysis into three sub-cases, depending on the relation between
vr .
1.
. Clearly, after this modification the new coefficients are non-negative. To show that Equation (8) still holds, we need to show that p(i), p(r) can be decomposed using the new coefficients. Notice that As a result, Equation (8) holds. As for Equation (9) , observe that
hence, Equation (9) holds. Finally,
,r while all other coefficients are left unchanged; thus Equation (10) holds as well.
2.
vr : the analysis is similar to the previous case and hence omitted. 3.
vr : the analysis is similar to the first case and hence omitted. This concludes the proof.
Omitted Proofs from Section 3.3
Proof of Proposition 1. We need to show that Inequality (2) holds for every history h. Since FEE operates in phases, it would be convenient to divide the arguments into these three phases, according to which phase h belongs.
• Exploration phase: the recommendation is based on the action of π * , the optimal policy of the GMDP in Subsection 3.1. If h is the empty history, then it is translated to s 0 , and π * selects a 1 w.p. 1. Otherwise, due to Equation (3) the action space of the GMDP is restricted to distributions over the unobserved arms with expectation greater or equal to the observed value R 1 . As a result, in both cases Inequality (2) holds.
• Experience phase: in this phase, FEE (h) is a distribution over two arms,r and i, with Rr greater than the obtained value R 1 of arm a 1 . Further, X i > Rr with positive probability, or otherwise arm a i would have been discarded (Lines 11-13). If, in addition, µ i ≥ R 1 , then the If sentence in Line 15 would select arm a i with probability 1, satisfying Inequality (2). On the other hand, if µ i < R 1 , then FEE selects arm a i w.p.
, and ar with the remaining probability (Lines [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] ; hence expected value of FEE (h) is
which is greater or equal to R 1 .
• Exploit phase: in this phase FEE (h) is a deterministic selection of one arm -the most rewarding one. Since the value of arm a 1 , R 1 was observed before (as mentioned for the exploration phase), the arm a i * selected in Line 20, satisfies R i * > R i .
One more property FEE exhibits is IC. The next theorem shows that when there are enough agents, the best action of each agent is to accept FEE's recommendation. To present it, we introduce the following quantity δ.
In words, δ i is the probability that arm a i is superior to all other arms. Clearly, if δ i = 0 for some i, we can safely ignore that arm and never explore it; therefore, δ i > 0 for every arm a i . Finally, let δ = min i∈[K] δ i . Theorem 2 implies that if there are poly(H, K, 1 δ ) agents, then FEE is IC.
Proof of Theorem 2. To prove the theorem, we need to show that whenever an agent is recommended arm a r , her best response is to select arm a r . We focus on an arbitrary agent, and present the analysis from her point of view. In addition, if r = 1, either she is the first agent to arrive at the system or no better arm was discovered, resulting in a 1 being a best response. Otherwise, r = 1. We define the following events: let E r rec be the event indicating that FEE recommends arm a r to the agent; E r open indicates whether arm a r was recommended to some agent; and E r opt indicates whether a r is an optimal arm. All of these events are defined w.r.t. the distribution over histories and the agent arrival distribution. Due to the uniform arrival distribution, the probability of E r rec matches the proportion of agents who are recommended arm a r . We proceed by analyzing the odds of being recommended a r . Due to the definition of ǫ and the way FEE works when it observed a superior arm,
Next, we present a lemma that gives a large deviation bound on the number of agents needed for the experience phase.
Lemma 3. Let Q(ǫ) = max{2KH, 2H 2 ln 1 ǫ }. The experience phase terminates after Q(ǫ) agents w.p. of at least 1 − ǫ.
The proof of Lemma 3 and other claims we use in this lemma appear just after the end of this proof. For simplicity, denote Q = Q(ǫ). Conditioning on E r open , arm a r is either recommended exactly once (in case its reward is observed to be inferior to another arm during the execution), or several times. The latter can only happen if R r > R 1 and arm a r is used by FEE to explore other, unobserved arms. In this case, Lemma 3 implies that would not happen more than Q times, w.h.p. As a result, Due to Observation 1, we also conclude that
We now analyze the ratio between the probability of arm a r being optimal and the probability that it is not, given E r rec . We have
.
Using the bounds from Equations (12), (13) and (14) on Equation (15), we get
and by rearranging we obtain
Next, we bound the expected difference between the reward of arm a r and that of an arbitrary arm a i , with i = r. We have
By plugging in the bound obtained in Equation (16) to Equation (17) we get
Ultimately, since
The proof is completed by combining Observation 2 with Equation (18) to show that E(X r −X i | E r rec ) ≥ 0 for every arm a i .
It suffices to show that the right-hand side of Equation (19) is greater or equal to H. Now,
Inserting the values of ǫ and Q, we argue that the statement holds as long as
To conclude the proof, recall that n ≥ 12HQ δ ; hence
thus, Equation (21) holds.
Proof of Claim 2. First, observe that
Next, notice that k ≤ Q 2H ; thus,
By using the multiplicative version of the Chernoff Bound, we get that
Recall that Q ≥ 2H 2 ln 1 ǫ ; therefore,
Proof of Observation 3. The exploration phase of FEE is based on π * . Once π * reaches a terminal state, there are two options:
• The terminate state exhibits β = R 1 . In this case, the statement of the If sentence in Line 7 is false, and there is no need for experience. Consequently, Z = 0 w.p. 1 and the statement holds.
• The terminate state exhibits β > R This applies for every iteration of the While loop. Recall that there are at most K − 2 arms needed to be explored, and hence the statement holds.
Optimality
Proof of Theorem 3. To facilitate the proof, we introduce the following definitions: given a mechanism M and a history h, we say that M is fruitless w.r.t. h if M (h) gives a positive probability to at least one observed arm a i , i = 1, with R i ≤ R 1 , i.e., reward that is at most R 1 (notice that it implies that a 1 and a i were observed). In addition, we say that a history h is auspicious if an action with reward greater than that of a 1 is observed under h. We are ready to begin the proof. Let M be an arbitrary mechanism, and for the sake of the proof fix the number of agents, and only consider histories of length of at most n. The proof contains three steps. In Step 1 we slightly modify M , resulting in a new mechanism M (1) that attains a social welfare at least as high as that of M , and is still EAIR. In Step 2, we modify M (1) to use an oracle whenever it reaches an auspicious history. As we show, the resulting mechanism, M (2) has an improved social welfare, SW (M (2) ) ≥ SW (M (1) ). Finally, in Step 3 we show that the social welfare of M (2) is at most W (π * , s 0 ).
Step 1: In this step we construct a modification of M with at least the same social welfare, which is not fruitless on any history h. We define a mechanism M (1) that receives M as a black box and uses it for recommendations. M (1) is defined as follows:
• R : S T → R is the reward function, defined on terminal states only. For each terminal state s = (O, U ) ∈ S T ,
Next, we prove that there exists an optimal policy for the R-GMDP with a significantly reduced support. 2. For every state s, W (π ′ , s) ≥ W (π, s).
The proof of the lemma is identical to the proof of Lemma 1 and hence omitted. Lemma 4 suggests that we can focus on strategies that distinguish between states based on U, α(O) and β(O) solely. The reduced state space does allows self loop by selecting a 1 , without having any effect on the reward. It is thus straightforward to see that an optimal strategy that ignores a 1 exists, with a reward of exactly W (π * , s 0 ).
Notice that M (2) defines a non-stationary policy π for the R-GMDP, by mimicking the actions (distributions) π selects. When M (2) gets to an auspicious history or could not explore anymore, the policy π gets to a terminal state and obtains a reward. Each time M (2) directs an agent, that agent gets at most the maximal reward M (2) discovered; hence, SW (M (2) ) is less or equal to the reward obtained by that non-stationary policy π, which is at most W (π * , s 0 ).
This completes the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let N 1 , N 2 denote the r.v. representing the number of agents in the explore and experience phases, respectively. Notice that the definition of social welfare given in Equation 1 can be interpreted as
Observe that every agent in the explore and experience phases obtains the reward of arm a 1 in expectation. Moreover, every agent in the exploit phase obtains W (π * , s 0 ) in expectation; hence, Equation (25) can be rearranged as
To finalize the proof, recall that N 1 ≤ K almost surely since there are K arms that could be explored, and on every step in the exploration phase exactly one arm gets explored. Moreover, due to Observation 3 it holds that E(N 2 ) ≤ KH; hence,
